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Cohesion Policy incentives for collaborative industrial research:
evaluation of a Smart Specialisation forerunner programme
Riccardo Crescenzia, Guido de Blasiob and Mara Giuac
ABSTRACT
This paper evaluates a programme of subsidies for collaborative industrial research (co-)funded by the European Union’s
Cohesion Policy in Italy mobilizing over €1 billion. In the 2007–13 funding cycle, the programme was a precursor to
some of the key features of Smart Specialisation Strategy (S3) programmes, offering evidence-based insights into
potential challenges of the practical application of the S3 approach. The programme was unsuccessful in boosting
investments, value added or employment of beneﬁciary ﬁrms. The collaborative dimension of the projects added limited
value and a more generous funding level would not have improved effectiveness. However, positive impacts emerged in
low-tech sectors.
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INTRODUCTION
The Smart Specialisation Strategy (S3) is a novel approach
to the design and implementation of innovation policies.
The Smart Specialisation concept emerged from the
Knowledge for Growth expert group in the framework of
the European Research Area (ERA) (Foray, David, &
Hall, 2009) as a means to explain the productivity gap
betweenEurope and theUnited States in terms of the differ-
ential penetration of information and communication tech-
nologies (ICT) in the two continents. According to Foray,
David, and Hall (2011), Smart Specialisation is ‘largely
about the policy process to select and prioritize ﬁelds or
areas where a cluster of activities should be developed, and
to let entrepreneurs discover the right domains of future
specialisation’ (p. 7). The S3 approach advocates the con-
centration of public resources in a set of clearly deﬁned
predetermined priority areas to be selected with a bottom-
up approach based on a process of ‘entrepreneurial discov-
ery’1 involving all relevant local stakeholders that should
cooperate to elaborate the best possible innovation strategy
for their own developmental future. In this framework,
each individual locality is supposed to embark on ‘a rigorous
self-assessment of [its] knowledge assets, capabilities and
competences and the key players between whom knowledge
is transferred’ (McCann & Ortega-Argilés, 2015, p. 3).
Despite being a recent concept with limited theoretical
elaboration, supporting evidence and applications, the new
approach proved an unprecedented success in the European
political market. Presented by the Foray group in 2009, it
already became a cornerstone of European Union (EU)
policies in 2013 when the ﬁnal deal on the 2014–20 pro-
gramming period was agreed. Smart Specialisation is now
a key component of the EU 2020 Innovation Plan as
well as the reformed EU Cohesion Policy, shaping both
innovation and regional development policies of the EU.
As a result, the Smart Specialisation approach is currently
being deployed in all countries and regions of the EU,
representing a potentially unprecedented shift from pre-
existing innovation policies.
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The evolution of EU innovation and Cohesion Policies
towards a Smart Specialisation approach was so rapid that
it did not allow much room for small-scale trialling of pro-
grammes inspired by the proposed paradigm or for policy
learning before large-scale implementation. Therefore, the
new practices and procedures established in the 2014–20
programming period lack a solid evidence basis on their
effectiveness and value added (e.g., in comparison with
pre-existing policies) and suffer from a limited under-
standing of what works (and what does not) in practice
and in different contexts. While the ex-ante characteristics
of the S3 strategies elaborated by the EU regions in com-
pliance with the new policy framework have been widely
analyzed, it is still too early to develop any ex-post evalu-
ation of their (intended and unintended) impacts. Expen-
diture data for the 2014–20 period are currently available
only at the programme level, with no information on ben-
eﬁciaries and applicants.2 Conversely, crucial decisions are
now forthcoming on: (1) how to maximize the impact of
ongoing S3 programmes; and (2) how to shape post-
2020 EU strategies in this area. In this context, the
analysis of the functioning and impact of ‘forerunner
programmes’ can provide useful insights to inform an
evidence-based debate on both fronts.
This paper exploits as an ‘experimental ﬁeld’ the unique
features of a large innovation programme implemented in
Italy with the support of the EU Cohesion Policy during
the programming cycle 2007–13: the Collaborative Indus-
trial Research (CIR) Programme. The CIR was designed
to support industrial research in less developed Italian
regions (the ‘Mezzogiorno’) and it acted as a forerunner
to many of the practical features later introduced in S3 pro-
grammes over the 2014–20 cycle. In particular: (1) funding
(approximately €1 billion) was distributed to beneﬁciaries
according to local demand for innovation activities; (2)
the programme funded only speciﬁc, preselected and highly
innovative (‘smart’) sectors; (3) it aimed at stimulating col-
laboration among ﬁrms and between ﬁrms and universities;
and (4) both the selection of the projects to be ﬁnanced
(assessed by independent committees) and their monitor-
ing during implementation needed to meet stringent trans-
parency criteria. Thanks to the scoring system that assigned
CIR funding to individual applicant ﬁrms, it is possible to
assess the impact of the programme by means of state-of-
the-art counterfactual methods. In particular, we compare
ﬁrm performance within a bandwidth of the scoring
threshold using regression discontinuity design (RDD)
techniques. We evaluate the impact of the programme in
terms of ﬁrst-order effects on investments and second-
order effects on value added and employment. We also
analyze the extent to which some ‘S3-style’ features of
this programme inﬂuenced effectiveness. Finally, we pro-
vide far-from-the-threshold inference and predict what
would have happened if ﬁrms with scores below the fund-
ing threshold (and therefore not funded) would have
gained access to the scheme by virtue of a more generous
funding of the programme.
The empirical results offer helpful insights into how to
maximize the impacts of similar programmes inspired by
the S3 strategy. The CIR did not produce any impact on
the performance of the beneﬁciary ﬁrms in terms of invest-
ments, value added and employment. The results suggest
that a more (or less) generous level of funding of the pro-
gramme would have not improved its effectiveness. The
ﬁndings offer limited support for the practical beneﬁts
from the collaborative dimension of the projects or for
the inclusion of research centres in the project partnerships.
Conversely, the programme was more successful in sup-
porting ﬁrms in low-tech sectors, suggesting that these
might be viable targets for well-balanced S3 programmes.
Finally, the effectiveness of the scheme on value added
(investment) is higher (lower) for ﬁrms with high patenting
capacity, while there seems to be scant support for the idea
that multinational corporations are key to successful inno-
vative collaborations.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SMART
SPECIALISATION STRATEGY (S3): KEY
KNOWLEDGE GAPS
The Lisbon Agenda presented the generation of new (tech-
nological) knowledge as key to productivity and economic
growth by increasing total EU research and development
(R&D) investments to 3% of EU gross domestic product
(GDP) by 2010. However, both the 2003 Sapir Report
and the 2005Mid-term review of the Lisbon Strategy high-
lighted the fundamental failure to achieve the proposed tar-
gets by means of a strategy exclusively focused on R&D.
The Knowledge for Growth expert group (advising the
European Commissioner for Research) seemed to provide
a new solution to an ‘old’ EU problem: ‘Smart Specialis-
ation’ as a means to ‘address the grand challenge’ (Foray
et al., 2009). ‘A more promising strategy appears to be to
encourage investment in programmes that will complement
the country’s other productive assets to create future dom-
estic capability and interregional comparative advantage.
We have termed this strategy “smart specialisation”’
(p. 20). Smart Specialisation strategies posit that entrepre-
neurs should be supported in their search for the most
promising technological sector so as to target their invest-
ments better. Smart Specialisation is one of the key pillars
of the EU 2020 strategy, aiming to promote a smart, sus-
tainable and inclusive economy delivering high levels of
employment, productivity and social cohesion. In particular
the Smart Specialisation pillar includes three ‘ﬂagship’
initiatives largely reﬂecting the priorities of the Smart
Specialisation strategy: Innovation Europe (focused on
R&D); Youth on the Move (focusing on human capital);
and A Digital Agenda for Europe (targeting ICT).
EU Cohesion Policy has fully internalized the Smart
Specialisation approach by aiming to identify the optimal
regional-level matching between innovation efforts,
human capital, and local industrial and technological
advantages (McCann & Ortega-Argilés, 2015). The archi-
tecture of the 2014–20 EU Cohesion Policy rests on the
assumption that the Smart Specialisation principles are
applicable to all regions: innovation is important for all
regions; for advanced ones to remain ahead and lagging
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ones to catch up. The process of ‘entrepreneurial discovery’
triggered by S3 is supposed to generate structural change
through the inclusive process of stakeholder involvement
and to make new activities (rather than sectors or individual
ﬁrms) the core priorities (Foray, 2015; Morgan, 2016).
Therefore, S3 requires stakeholders to have a global per-
spective on their potential competitive advantage, to be
aware of their potential for cooperation, and to focus
their efforts and resources on a limited number of ambi-
tious realistic priorities through which to create a critical
mass of research and development (R&D) activities, lead-
ing to structural change and growth (Radosevic, Curaj,
Gheorghiu, Andreescu, & Wade, 2017). S3 is therefore
expected to allow EU countries and regions to ‘strengthen
their research and innovation systems, maximize knowl-
edge ﬂows, improve absorption and utilization capacities
as well as spread the beneﬁts of innovation throughout
their economies’ (Hegyi & Rakhmatullin, 2017, p. 5).
Coherent with this approach, the European Commis-
sion presents all EU regions with a portfolio of tools
inspired by the S3 approach to be selected, combined and
coordinated in line with local needs: innovation clusters,
innovation-friendly environment for small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs), lifelong learning in research
and innovation, regional research infrastructure and centres
of competence, creativity and cultural industries, fast inter-
net applications and easy access to online contents, and the
use of public procurement to support demand for innova-
tive products and services.
What is the evidence for the impact of the innovation
policy tools implemented so far by the EU regions?
A recent comprehensive review (What Works Centre for
Local Economic Growth, 2015)3 of impact evaluation ana-
lyses of publicly funded programmes supporting innovation
highlighted that only 17 of 42 reviewed papers identiﬁed
some positive impact of active innovation policies on pro-
ductivity (Aguiar & Gagnepain, 2013; Grilli & Murtinu,
2012; Sissoko, 2013), employment (Benavente, Crespi, &
Mafﬁoli, 2007; Einiö, 2014; Moretti & Wilson, 2013),
or other measures of ﬁrm performance, for example,
sales, turnover and proﬁt (Nishimura & Okamuro, 2011).
Moreover, the review concluded that programmes empha-
sizing public–private collaboration tend to perform better
than those that exclusively support private ﬁrms. Addition-
ally, only competitive subsidies have positive effects.
Finally, the more general consolidated evidence is that eval-
uating the impact of R&D loans, subsidies and grants is
extremely complex, even when individual programmes are
relatively simple in terms of policy design and implemen-
tation. Only a limited number of impact evaluation studies
can directly trace the full range of policy effects; none can
attribute these effects to speciﬁc features of the correspond-
ing programme (on the case of Italy, see Bertamino, Bron-
zini, De Maggio, & Revelli, 2016; Bondonio &
Greenbaum, 2012; Bronzini & Piselli, 2016; Corsino,
Gabriele, & Giunta, 2015; Fantino & Cannone, 2013;
and Merito, Giannangeli, & Bonaccorsi, 2010).
If the existing literature is far from unanimous on the
impact of active innovation policies on a variety of measures
of ﬁrm performance, solid evidence on the returns to the
novel features introduce by S3 is non-existent. A large
part of the existing empirical literature on Smart Specialis-
ation has focused on the engagement with private ﬁrms,
government and civil society (Gianelle, Guzzo, & Miesz-
kowski, 2017), on the capacity of ﬁrms and regional and
local governments to prioritize needs and opportunities
clearly (Vivanco, Elorduy, & Eguía, 2016), on patterns of
regional diversiﬁcation (Balland, Boschma, & Rigby,
2016), and on the challenges for implementation in less
developed regions (Innocenti & Lazzaretti, 2016).
The magnitude of the ﬁnancial resources mobilized by
S3 as well as its spatial and thematic extent make it particu-
larly urgent to ﬁll the substantial gap in the policy knowl-
edge basis. If it is too early for any credible counterfactual
assessment of the impacts of S3 measures, it is still possible
to look into the copious experience accumulated over pre-
vious programming periods in order to identify suitable
programmes that brought forward (at least some of) the
features of the ‘new’ programmes inspired by the S3
approach. A policy-learning exercise aimed to extrapolate
out from a particular ‘historical’ case in order to draw
some (at least tentative) conclusions and guidance for
ongoing policies.
THE COLLABORATIVE INDUSTRIAL
RESEARCH (CIR) PROGRAMME
The CIR4 is a scheme of the Research and Competitive-
ness Programme (PON R&C), which accounts for almost
50% of the total budget of the National Operational Pro-
grammes co-funded in Italy by the 2007–13 EU Cohesion
Policy. The CIR budget – roughly €1 billion jointly funded
by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)
and national sources5 – is intended to subsidize industrial
research projects undertaken by ﬁrms located in less devel-
oped Italian regions (i.e., the regions included in the Con-
vergence Objective for the 2007–13 programming cycle:
Calabria, Campania, Apulia and Sicily). The CIR
competitive funding scheme is coordinated by a national
strategic unit and activated by local stakeholders in collab-
oration with each other. Firms apply for funding made
available by the programme by submitting detailed project
applications based on the identiﬁcation of their own priori-
ties and collaboration strategies with other ﬁrms and other
research-active local stakeholders. The programme aims to
foster both public and private R&D by means of the inter-
actions between direct grants to universities and R&D sub-
sidies to private ﬁrms. CIR applicants should identify and
justify their own context-speciﬁc priorities within a set of
nine preselected highly innovative activities eligible for
funding: ICT; advanced materials; energy and energy
saving; health and biotechnology; agro-industrial system;
aerospace and aeronautics; cultural heritage; transport and
advanced logistics; environment and safety (for additional
information, see Appendix A in the supplemental data
online). Only projects that fall clearly into one of these pri-
ority areas are eligible for funding (concentration of
resources). In addition, CIR applicants should also identify
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ex-ante their collaboration strategy, with the CIR guide-
lines dictating that each project should be submitted by
multiple ﬁrms and that consortia that also include research
centres would be favoured in the selection process (colla-
borative dimension).
The National Operational Programme in charge of the
implementation of the CIR in 2007–13 later acquired
responsibility over the implementation of the national S3
in 2014–20. In addition, the CIR in 2007–13 and S3 in
2014–20 have a number of other similarities that make
the S3 the natural large-scale evolution of the CIR. The
same managing authority (the Ministry of Economic
Development together with the Ministry of Education,
Universities and Research) has responsibility over both
CIR and S3 programmes. Both the CIR and S3 address
the same categories of local beneﬁciaries (i.e., ﬁrms, univer-
sities, research centres). The size of their ﬁnancial endow-
ment and the ﬁnancing funds are comparable. The
territorial coverage (Mezzogiorno regions) is the same.
The selection process of the projects to be funded is also
very similar in terms of both procedures and timeline.
They also share the same submission platform (named
SIRIO). Finally, they both actively promote partnerships
among ﬁrms, and university–industry collaborations, con-
centrating ﬁnancial support in speciﬁc preselected, and
almost perfectly overlapping, sectors. These similarities
not only show the conceptual, operational and administra-
tive continuity between the CIR and S3 but also suggest
that the CIR anticipated some relevant characteristics
later picked up by other schemes implemented in the
2014–20 period under the S3 framework.
While a number of relevant points of contact between
the CIR and S3 do exist –making policy learning possible –
some key caveats should be taken into account when asses-
sing the external validity of the results. First, the CIR was
implemented in less developed regions (Mezzogiorno)
within the institutional setting of a Mediterranean country
(Italy) during the years immediately following the Great
Recession. Furthermore, the CIR did not embed any entre-
preneurial discovery processes typical of the S3 approach:
even if in practice the CIR targeted nine preselected sectors
almost perfectly matching the 12 areas of intervention later
identiﬁed by the S3 in 2014–20,6 the CIR’s sectoral target-
ing was not driven by a fully ﬂedged self-diagnostic process
but rather based on national strategic priorities.
The CIR was launched in January 2010 by means of an
open call issued by the managing authority of the PON
R&C, inviting ﬁrms to submit industrial research projects
for the scheme to ﬁnance. By the end ofApril 2010 (the sub-
mission deadline), 533 applications were submitted for a
total amount of requested subsidies of approximately €6 bil-
lion. Applications involved approximately 2000 entities
(ﬁrms, research centres and/or universities). The evaluation
of the funding applications by panels of independent
experts7 took place in May–June 2010. Applications were
evaluated in light of their expected economic returns by
means of a three-step evaluation procedure. The call for
applications speciﬁed that a key selection criterion for the
successful projects was the assessment by the selection
panel of the expected impacts on industrial competitiveness
of the development and implementation of the new technol-
ogies proposed in the application. InMay 2010, the ranking
of the applications was released. A single score was assigned
to each application project ranging from 20.48 and 138.17.
All project applications scoring below 96.0 were deemed
ineligible for ﬁnancing by the call for applications. The
remaining eligible proposals (196 in total) were funded sub-
ject to budget availability following their rank order. Given
the available budget and total funding requested by each
project, only projects that received a score above 104.4
were in fact funded, whereas some eligible projects did not
receive any funding due to lack of sufﬁcient funding (32 pro-
jects received no subsides, notwithstanding their eligibility
granted by a score above 96). A total of 143 large enterprises,
229 SMEs, 167micro-enterprises, 237 universities and 161
research entities received funding. The average value of the
ﬁnanced projects was roughly €9 million, with an average
subsidy of roughly €6 million.
Funded projects were mandated to start the proposed
activities as soon as possible following the announcement
of the results and to conclude the entire project in a maxi-
mum of three years from the start date. In order to enforce
these requirements strictly, projects could beneﬁt from an
upfront transfer of up to 75% of the total funding con-
ditional on having started the project by 30 October
2011. It is also important to stress that projects that
received funding under the CIR programme could not
receive any funding from any other source. This made it
possible to exclude a priori any additional confounding
source of funding at the time of the application as well as
for the entire duration of the project. Unfortunately, the
same conditions did not apply to the projects that did
not receive funding. In order to mitigate any confounding
factor, we checked with the OpenCoesione8 data set to see
whether ﬁrms applying for projects not ﬁnanced by the
CIR received any other form of EU funding from 2012
onwards, and we excluded from the analysis all ﬁrms that
received other forms of funding.9
DATA
All data related to the CIR were taken from its ofﬁcial data-
base (named SIRIO), which we accessed thanks to the
PON R&C managing authority. For each project, the
database included the evaluation score as well as a wide
set of characteristics, including the tax code of the partici-
pating ﬁrms. The ﬁrms’ tax code allowed a merging of the
CIR data set with ﬁrms’ balance-sheet information from
CERVED (a database with ﬁrm-level budget data),
employment data from the National Institute for Social
Security (INPS), patent data from ORBIS (a ﬁrm-level
database provided by Bureau van Dijk merged with Organ-
isation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) Patstat), as well as additional project-level data
from OpenCoesione. The analysis focused on ﬁrm-level
data. Each ﬁrm could, in principle, participate in more
than one funded project (while ﬁrms participating in
both a subsidized and an unsubsidized project were
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removed from the analysis). In order to account for the het-
erogeneous start dates of projects, we considered the yearly
averages (referring to the time span in which ﬁrms actually
received funding) as outcomes. The variables used in the
empirical analysis are listed in Appendix B in the sup-
plemental data online.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND
IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY
The empirical analysis aims to evaluate whether the receipt
of CIR subsidies makes a difference to the ﬁrms’ perform-
ance. As discussed above, subsidies were granted according
to the scoring assigned by the independent evaluators: only
the projects that received a score above the cut-off of 104.4
were actually funded. We exploited this discontinuity to
investigate the causal impact of the CIR scheme on ﬁrm
performance. In principle, projects ranked differently may
differ in terms of many observed and unobserved character-
istics that can be correlated with measures of ﬁrm perform-
ance. For instance, highly scored projects might be of
superior intrinsic quality and, therefore, they might not
face any credit constraint that would prevent their
implementation even in absence of the funding. By apply-
ing an RDD, we were able to differentiate out all the
characteristics of the projects that may confound the identi-
ﬁcation of the causal effect of the scheme. The key intuition
behind this research design was that projects just below the
cut-off (non-ﬁnanced) make a suitable comparisons for
those just above the cut-off (ﬁnanced). This strategy was
deemed preferable to other non-experimental methods
because if the units of analysis cannot precisely manipulate
the forcing variable (the ranking), the variation in treat-
ment around the threshold is randomized as if the projects
had been randomly drawn just below or just above the
threshold (Lee & Card, 2008).
One implication of the local randomized result is that
the empirical validity of the RDD can be empirically tested.
If the variation in the treatment near the threshold is
approximately randomized, it follows that all ‘baseline cov-
ariates’ – those variables determined before the realization
of the forcing variable (the score) – should have about the
same distribution just above and just below the cut-off.
We present below a test for the absence of discontinuity
in baseline characteristics around the threshold that sub-
stantiates the empirical strategy. The causal effect of the
CIR is assessed by allowing the outcome variable to be a
function of the score and testing the existence of a discon-
tinuity in the intercept at the threshold. The forcing vari-
able is centred at the cut-off value. In order not to
impose any restrictions on the underlying conditional
mean functions, the function of the centred score was inter-
acted with the treatment dummy (Angrist & Pischke,
2011), using the speciﬁcation:
Yijt = a+ f (scoreij) + Tij[b1 + f (scoreij)]+ 1ijt (1)
where i is the ﬁrm; j is the project; t is the time period (2011–
14); and the standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity
and clustered at the project level (Lee &Card, 2008). In the
main speciﬁcation models are estimated by following Athey
and Imbens (2016), that is, within the optimal bandwidth
and with the optimal polynomial degree (Calonico, Catta-
neo, & Titiunik, 2014). For the purpose of robustness
checks, models were also estimatedwith a global polynomial
function of up to degree three with the Akaike information
criterion (AIC) selecting the best speciﬁcation.We also pro-
vided estimation results to check for the presence of hetero-
geneous impacts at the threshold. In this case (as in Becker,
Egger, & von Ehrlich, 2013; and Accetturo, de Blasio, &
Ricci, 2014), we added to equation (1) an additional forcing
variable (Z ) that accounts for the conditioning aspect under
investigation. Speciﬁcations (1) and (2) were also estimated
by including ﬁrms’ ﬁxed effects:10
Yijt = a+ f (scoreij)+ g(Zij)
+ Tij[b1 + f (scoreij) + g(Zij)]+ 1ijt
(2)
While the identiﬁcation strategy delivers a highly credible
picture of the effect of the subsidy for the subpopulation of
ﬁrms close to the threshold, the RDD results may be less
informative for those further away. This is unfortunate
because, in the present case, identiﬁcation away from the
cut-off is particularly relevant, policy-makers might want
to know what might have happened if ﬁrms with scores
below the threshold would have gained access to the scheme.
By the same token, they might wonder whether the public
money spent on the ﬁrms that easily pass the admission
threshold carries with it deadweight losses. To gain some
insights into this regard, we make use of the Angrist and
Rokkanen (2015) conditional independence assumption
(CIA). The CIA breaks the relationship between treatment
status and outcomes by means of a vector of covariates such
that, conditional on it, outcomes are (mean) independent of
the running variable. The vector of covariates is then used to
identify counterfactual values for the outcome variables of
interest away from the cut-off.
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
In this section we ﬁrst document the baseline RDD results
at the 104.4 cut-off. We the substantiate the validity of the
RDD identiﬁcation strategy by looking at manipulation,
balancing and placebos. Next, we search for interesting
asymmetries at the threshold, which might clarify the
mechanisms at work. Finally, we provide the extrapolations
away from the cut-off.
Baseline
Table 1 reports the baseline results. We consider three out-
come variables: Investment, Value Added and number of
Employees. All are speciﬁed as a logarithmic growth rate
(over the 2011–14 period) standardized with respect to
the initial (2010) size of the balance sheet.11 The variable
Investment includes both tangible and intangible capital
outlays, as the CIR does not discriminate between the
two. We sum all investments undertaken by each ﬁrm.
Estimates are derived from a semiparametric estimator,
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where the optimal bandwidth and the polynomial degree,
according to which the models are estimated, are selected
by the Stata routine robust (Athey & Imbens, 2016;
Calonico et al., 2014). The number of observations
reported in Table 1 are therefore ‘determined’ by the rou-
tine as they correspond to the optimal bandwidth which
it has identiﬁed. The results reported in Table 1 suggest
that the impact at the threshold is negative and generally
not signiﬁcant (borderline statistical signiﬁcance is found
for Value Added).
As a preliminary robustness check, we want to verify
that these results continue to hold for different speciﬁca-
tions. Table C1 in Appendix C in the supplemental data
online reports those from parametric (global higher order
polynomial approximations) regressions. In this case, the
impact at the threshold is estimated by considering the
full sample of observations. The forcing variable is included
with the degree of polynomial ( f ) allowed to vary differ-
ently on the two sides of the threshold, interacted with
the treatment dummy and selected by the AIC. The AIC
suggests that the best degree of the polynomial approxi-
mations are (1-1), (3-1) and (3-1) respectively for the
three outcomes. These additional results conﬁrm those
reported in Table 1, with a non-signiﬁcant impact of the
CIR for all outcomes. Figure C1 in Appendix C illustrates
the classical RDD graph for the outcome Investment in the
AIC preferred speciﬁcation, where the threshold is normal-
ized to zero for convenience.
Testing the validity of the identiﬁcation
framework
The RDD framework relies on the fact that ﬁrms cannot
manipulate their ranking in order to obtain funding. In
our case, this requirement seems to be trivially veriﬁed, as
the score is assigned by the panel of independent experts.
In any case, we investigate the smoothness of our forcing
variable (the score) around the threshold. Figure C2 in
Appendix C in the supplemental data online plots the
density of ﬁrms (using bin sizes of 10). A visual inspection
shows no increase in the probability mass after the
threshold. At any rate, the hypothesis of non-random sort-
ing around the cut-off is rejected on the basis of the test
developed by McCrary (2008).
To test the assumption that the assignment of the
treatment near the cut-off is approximately randomized,
we examine whether the observed baseline covariates are
locally balanced on either side of the cut-off. The
regression discontinuity provides a natural framework to
check whether some confounding factor is driving some
spurious correlation. It sufﬁces to run RDD regressions
(of the type in equation 1) using as dependent variables
those factors that the researcher suspects might be driving
the results. If no effect is detected, then that variable can
be considered as controlled for in the RDD exercise. We
focus on a long list of ﬁrm and project characteristics:
from balance sheet data we focus on tangible and intangi-
ble capital, indicators of cash ﬂow and of the liability side
of the balance sheet, which proxy for credit constraints,
traditional proxies for proﬁtability, labour and service
costs, and the number of employees (from the INPS).
We also test the project and ﬁrm features that capture
the S3 elements, such as the nature and dimension of
the project’s partnership (presence of a university, number
of subjects collaborating), the activity of the project, the
economic sectors of the ﬁrms, its innovative capacities
and its internationalization. These variables will be used
below to check for heterogeneous effects at the threshold.
The results (which are derived from the same speciﬁcation
as in Table 1) are shown in Table 2. No jump occurs at
the threshold for most of the baseline covariates. Excep-
tions refer to the return on assets (ROA). As explained
by Lee and Lemieux (2010), some of the differences in
covariates across the threshold might be statistically sig-
niﬁcant by random chance. To check for this possibility,
we combine the multiple tests into a single test statistic
that measures whether data are broadly consistent with
the random treatment hypothesis around the cut-off.
We carry out a x2 test for discontinuity gaps by estimat-
ing seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR), where each
equation represents a different baseline covariate. In
none of the equations is there any evidence of
discontinuities.12
Table C2 in Appendix C in the supplemental data
online documents some of the experiments we ran to
test the robustness of the results further. We show coef-
ﬁcients from placebo experiments, estimating the impact
of the CIR on Investments, Value Added and Employ-
ment where no treatment takes place. We document
the results obtained by using a ﬁctitious threshold (we
use 94.4 instead of the actual 104.4) and then a ﬁctitious
time window (we maintain the true cut-off and verify
what happens in the pretreatment period 2008–10 rather
than the post-intervention period). Should these placebos
provide statistically signiﬁcant results, the comparability
between treated and controls units in the sample might
be in jeopardy. Reassuringly, the results are very suppor-
tive, except for the coefﬁcient on Employment when a
Table 1. Impact of Collaborative Industrial Research (CIR) on
investments, value added and employment (non-parametric
results).
Investments
Value
Added Employment
Treatment –0.9572
(0.7053)
–1.0903*
(0.5156)
–0.2213
(0.5841)
Constant –2.8617***
(0.5862)
–1.0051**
(0.3655)
–5.4239***
(0.3446)
R2 0.0213 0.0858 0.107
Polynomial
degree
1 1 1
Observations 105 67 66
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the project level.
Estimates were derived with the optimal bandwidth and polynomial
degree selected by the routine robust (Calonico et al., 2014).
Signiﬁcance levels: ***< 0.001; **< 0.010; *< 0.050.
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mock threshold is used. This ﬁnding (which, however,
does not show up when different fake thresholds are
used) signals that the evidence on CIR employment
impacts might be less robust when compared with
those on Investment and Value Added.
Heterogeneity at the threshold
We move next to check whether the results at the border
show any discernible asymmetries. In particular, we are
interested in the S3 forerunner characteristics of the CIR.
Table 3 shows the results obtained by estimating equation
(2) with reference to six additional forcing variables, those
indexed by Zk (with k ¼ 1–6). Preliminarily, it should be
noted that the variables Zk are continuous at the 104.4
threshold, as shown in Table 3. Therefore, the estimation
of equation (2) is a feasible exercise (Becker et al., 2013;
Accetturo et al., 2014). Note that the ﬁndings reported
in Table 3 should be interpreted with care, as the additional
forcing variables Zk might be cross-correlated. Moreover,
some might be endogenous to the scheme. For instance,
knowing that the inclusion of an academic partner raises
the CIR score might have induced participants to include
universities in their applications in order to maximize
their probability of receiving the grants, with limited inter-
est in actual collaborations.
The investigation of the CIR mechanisms that more
directly pre-empted some of the features of the pro-
grammes inspired by the S3 approach leads to the following
evidence.
The participation of a university (Z1) in the application
seems to have a positive effect (which is signiﬁcant when
we control for ﬁrms’ ﬁxed effects) on employment in the
beneﬁciary ﬁrms. However, in contrast to the predictions
of an extensive literature on the beneﬁts of university–
industry collaborations, no effect is recorded on ﬁrms’
Investments and Value Added. In general, the collaborative
dimension of the applications (Z2) does not seem to add to
the overall impact of the scheme. On average, projects that
involve a larger number of ﬁrms (i.e., those with more than
13 partners among ﬁrms and universities) perform rela-
tively worse than others (the negative interactions enter
highly signiﬁcantly when the outcomes are Value Added
and Employment).
As for the innovative nature of the activities supported
by the scheme, we consider those that can be classiﬁed as
‘advanced’ in terms of knowledge intensity and technologi-
cal capabilities. Since knowledge generation, accumulation
and diffusion have been widely recognized as key drivers of
ﬁrm competitiveness, knowledge-intensive activities
should in principle attract the larger share of the beneﬁts
from the scheme. In particular, we identify CIR projects
in the activity areas: ICT, advanced materials, health and
biotechnologies and aerospace and aeronautics (Z3). How-
ever, the results suggest that funds channelled to this type
of activities do not offer higher ﬁrm-level returns in com-
parison with other – more traditional – areas of activity
(i.e., energy and energy reduction, agro-industrial system,
cultural heritage, transport and advanced logistics, environ-
ment and safety). When ﬁrm-level ﬁxed effects are
included, the results suggest that CIR has a negative impact
on employment levels: ﬁrms involved in advanced activities
shift their production process towards more capital-inten-
sive processes reducing labour input.
Looking at the characteristics of the beneﬁciary ﬁrms,
the empirical evidence suggests that the scheme has bene-
ﬁted relatively more ﬁrms operating in low-tech sectors
(Z4) (as to the EUROSTAT/OECD classiﬁcations13).
These ﬁrms are those facing stronger constraints in terms
of access to credit as well as those for which collaboration
Table 2. Balancing for the baseline covariates.
Treatment Observations R2
Tangible capital 0.0136
(0.0081)
103 0.0193
Intangible capital 0.0103
(0.0073)
99 0.0119
Value added 9890.526
(5873.65)
105 0.0253
Sales 52340.63
(35227.32)
103 0.0299
Total balance sheet 55381.84
(28109.31)
105 0.0209
Return on assets
(ROA)
–5.5281*
(2.6408)
104 0.0577
Return on equity
(ROE)
0.0003
(0.0003)
102 0.0288
Cash ﬂow 2812.833
(2378.991)
105 0.0368
Consolidated debt 0.0143
(0.0119)
71 0.0177
Labour cost 5635.963
(3398.668)
99 0.0207
Service cost 17976.27
(11717.51)
105 0.0284
Employees 0.0006
(0.0003)
54 0.1670
Project with a
university
0.4550
(0.2407)
105 0.1339
Project in advanced
activities
0.1393
(0.2798)
105 0.0453
Project with low-
tech ﬁrms
0.2253
(0.1824)
105 0.0921
Project with
patenting ﬁrms
–0.6956
(1.5266)
105 0.0522
Project of large
consortium
0.4187
(0.2330)
105 0.0778
Project with
multinational ﬁrms
0.0530
(0.0547)
105 0.0319
Notes: Results were estimated according to the sample identiﬁed in Table 1,
column 1. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the project
level. The variables were measured in the pretreatment year.
Signiﬁcance levels: ***< 0.001; **< 0.010; *< 0.050.
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Table 3. Heterogeneity at the threshold.
Investments Value Added Employment
Z1: Public research (presence of a
university in the project partnership)
Treatment –0.1453
(0.9740)
–1.6309
(0.8394)
–1.0830
(0.6305)
Z1 0.6483
(0.7095)
0.4601
(0.4736)
–0.5239
(0.3017)
Treatment*Z1 –1.1480
(0.8926)
0.4142
(0.7503)
1.0767*
(0.4205)
P Wald test 0.1900 0.0952 0.0671
R2 0.0345 0.133 0.128
Observations 105 67 66
Z2: Collaboration (project partnership
involving a large number of ﬁrms)
Treatment –0.8257
(0.8022)
–0.5536
(0.5951)
0.4983
(0.6472)
Z2 0.4890
(0.2533)
1.1821**
(0.4141)
1.0165**
(0.3181)
Treatment*Z2 –0.5514
(0.5438)
–1.9874***
(0.5263)
–1.9942***
(0.4992)
P Wald test 0.0323 0.0000 0.0004
R2 0.028 0.258 0.268
Observations 105 67 66
Z3: Activities (activity of the project
classiﬁed as advanced)
Treatment –0.7342
(0.8483)
–1.0119
(0.5909)
0.2194
(0.6722)
Z3 –0.1317
(0.6254)
0.1623
(0.3259)
1.1249*
(0.4186)
Treatment*Z3 –0.4083
(0.4439)
–0.2672
(0.4907)
–1.4622*
(0.5910)
P Wald test 0.3730 0.1402 0.0632
R2 0.038 0.088 0.192
Observations 105 67 66
Z4: Low-tech (ﬁrms operating in low-
tech sectors)
Treatment –1.2547
(0.7253)
–1.0107
(0.5458)
–0.2179
(0.6059)
Z4 –0.2369
(0.2933)
–0.5737*
(0.2650)
–1.6071***
(0.2222)
Treatment*Z4 1.2951**
(0.4333)
0.1203
(0.4162)
1.3514**
(0.4749)
P Wald test 0.0121 0.0072 0.0000
R2 0.065 0.107 0.139
Observations 105 67 66
Z5: Patenting (ﬁrms with a high
capacity of patenting)
Treatment –0.8859
(0.6939)
1.2257*
(0.5449)
–0.3824
(0.5857)
Z5 0.1774***
(0.0465)
–0.1124*
(0.0476)
–0.0683**
(0.0259)
Treatment*Z5 –0.1697***
(0.0477)
0.2223***
(0.0596)
0.1248
(0.0876)
P Wald test 0.0000 0.0054 0.0730
R2 0.031 0.110 0.138
Observations 105 67 66
(Continued )
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with more innovative counterparts might offer the highest
returns (for more evidence on this category of ﬁrms in the
case of Italy, see Benfratello, Schiantarelli, & Sembenelli,
2008; and Giovannetti, Ricchiuti, & Velucchi, 2011).
Firms active in low-tech sectors can expand both their
investments and employment with no immediate trade-
off between capital deepening and employment levels.
The results for ﬁrms with a high ex-ante patenting track
record (Z5) are instead less straightforward: the impact on
Investment is negative (although not signiﬁcant when con-
trolling for ﬁrms’ ﬁxed effects), while Value Added seems to
have been positively inﬂuenced by the subsidies. This evi-
dence is probably capturing the lifecycle of innovative activi-
ties: ﬁrms can take full advantage of CIR incentives in terms
of innovation output (measured by value added) when their
stock of knowledge (existing patents) is already formed. In
this case, CIR incentives are used to capitalize on the poten-
tial of previous investments (by increasing sales, for
instance) rather than to support further investment. When
controlling for ﬁrms’ ﬁxed effects, therefore, we could
observe that ﬁrms with a high ex-ante patenting stock also
experience a positive impact in terms of employment.
Finally, a programme’s effectiveness was limited for
multinational corporations (Z6), suggesting that in order
to maximize returns to innovative investment, S3 pro-
grammes would need to ﬁnd the right approach to take
into account the speciﬁcities of these ﬁrms and mobilize
their potential. Even if domestic/SMEs can play an impor-
tant role in innovation processes, the key innovation players
remain large and often multinational ﬁrms.
Far-from-the-threshold extrapolations
The results discussed so far are valid only for ﬁrms very
close to the funding cut-off. By using Angrist and Rokka-
nen’s (2015) CIA we can analyze the impact of the CIR far
from the threshold. This is equivalent to exploring what
Table 3. Continued.
Investments Value Added Employment
Z6: Internationalization (multinational
corporations)
Treatment 0.8960
(0.7070)
–1.3914**
(0.4655)
–0.4506
(0.5474)
Z6 –0.2511
(0.5401)
1.8244***
(0.3209)
1.3255***
(0.2883)
Treatment*Z6 –0.7148
(0.6535)
–0.9529*
(0.3698)
–1.7699*
(0.7928)
P Wald test 0.0225 0.0000 0.0005
R2 0.048 0.245 0.186
Observations 105 67 66
Notes: Same speciﬁcation as in Table 1. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the project level.
Signiﬁcance levels: ***< 0.001; **< 0.010; *< 0.050.
Figure 1. Conditional independence assumption (CIA)-based estimates, employment.
Note: Graphical representation of CIA-based estimates (Angrist & Rokkanen, 2015). The extrapolations are computed through a
linear reweighting procedure. The ﬁtted values for observed outcomes are represented by the dots (to the left of the cut-off) and
the squares (to the right of the cut-off). On the right of the cut-off triangles represent the CIA-based extrapolations.
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might have happened with a more stringent (or more gen-
erous) funding threshold. As discussed in the ﬁfth section,
the possibility to extrapolate the impact of CIR for ﬁrms
distant from the cut-off relies on breaking the relationship
between treatment status and outcomes by means of a vec-
tor of covariates such that, conditional on it, outcomes are
(mean) independent of the running variable.
To ensure that the relationship between the running
variable and the outcomes has been removed, we run for
each outcome CIA tests from estimation windows of var-
ious width. The CIA test comes from models that control
for tangible and intangible capital, value added, total balance
sheet, cash ﬂow, labour cost, service cost and employees (all
measured in 2010 before the launch of the programme). The
results show that for both Investment and Value Added the
CIA is violated starting from the smallest bandwidth used
(15 score points on the two sides of the ﬁnancing cut-off).
Therefore, for these two outcomes we cannot provide far-
from-the-threshold extrapolations. On the other hand, for
the outcome Employment and up to the bandwidth of [–
32, 32] score points, we fail to ﬁnd any sign of CIA viola-
tions (see Table C3 in Appendix C in the supplemental
data online). Therefore, limited toEmployment we can pro-
vide far-from-the-threshold inference for up to the 30% of
the observations in the sample. The results suggest that a
more (or less) generous level of funding of the scheme
would not have affected the programme’s effectiveness.
The CIA extrapolations for employment on the right of
the cut-off are depicted in Figure 1.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has investigated the impact of CIR – a pro-
gramme designed to foster industrial innovation in less
developed regions of the Italian Mezzogiorno. Given the
lack of direct empirical evidence on S3 impact to inform
current scholarly and policy debate, the analysis of this fore-
runner programme might offer relevant insights to support
the design and implementation of programmes inspired by
the S3 approach in the 2014–20 programming cycle and
provide helpful material for evidence-based reﬂections on
post-2020 EU policies.
The results suggest that the impact of CIR on ﬁrm per-
formance has been limited in terms of additional invest-
ments, value added and employment. The analysis has
also unveiled the heterogeneity of the estimated impacts
along a number of features of the scheme and of the bene-
ﬁciary ﬁrms. Unfortunately, as customary in the pro-
gramme evaluation literature, we can identify the (average
and heterogeneous) effects of the policy but cannot draw
conclusions about the underlying drivers (e.g., are the
tools selected by CIR appropriate to achieve innovation?;
are the selection procedures suitable to identify the most
suitable beneﬁciaries? etc.).
However, the key insights from the analysis call for a
cautious approach to the reform of innovation policies.
The simultaneous introduction of new features, condition-
alities and requirements in innovation programmes might
be a risky choice if not accompanied by speciﬁc processes
consolidating the policy’s framework. The entrepreneurial
discovery processes embedded in the S3 framework
might still be able to make the difference during the
2014–20 period where fully and correctly implemented in
less developed regions notwithstanding their generally
weak institutional context. In general, a gradual and evi-
dence-based approach to policy reforms might be the
best approach until robust evidence is produced about the
impact and value added of alternative policy options.
Collaboration is an increasingly important feature of all
innovative activities (Crescenzi, Nathan, & Rodríguez-
Pose, 2016) and the S3 has created the preconditions for
the development of policy tools aimed at reinforcing the col-
laborative dimension of innovation policies.However, when
collaborations are not the result of an open and uncon-
strained search for the best possible partners but – on the
contrary – are induced by public policy incentives, they fail
to generate positive impacts. Collaborations with univer-
sities have offered limited beneﬁts to partner ﬁrms but also
collaborations with other private ﬁrms have generated no
impact on the effectiveness ofCIR.Moreover, large partner-
ships have proven highly dysfunctional leading to negative
impacts on ﬁrm performance. In light of this evidence, pol-
icy-makers should consider very carefully the practical tools
leveraged by the various S3 programmes in order to foster
collaboration. Collaboration should reﬂect the genuine
needs of local innovation agents and single-applicant sub-
missions might be the best option in some cases. Therefore,
the collaborative dimension of S3 projects should not be a
requirement to be ‘rewarded’ as such but should be sup-
ported only when a clear rationale is provided in light of
the speciﬁc technological problem that the applicant intends
to solve.
The preselection of high-knowledge-intensity areas of
activity has also failed to deliver the intended beneﬁts
when compared with more traditional technological
domains. Again, this calls for a broad approach to inno-
vation policies to be based on careful diagnoses of the fea-
tures of the regional economy. Where more traditional
technological domains can be identiﬁed as a potential
source of competitive advantage, policy-makers should
not signal any preference in the allocation of funding in
favour of more advanced sectors. On the contrary, at the
moment many EU less developed regions – irrespective
of their initial conditions – have submitted their S3 Oper-
ational Programmes, placing a strong emphasis on
advanced technological domains in an attempt to maximize
their chances to receive funding for their ‘smart’ choices.
The capability of ﬁrms to beneﬁt from S3 is likely to be
heterogeneous. The analysis of CIR suggests that ﬁrms
active in low-tech sectors are those more likely to beneﬁt
from S3-style support to their innovation activities.
These ﬁrms face more difﬁculties in accessing credit to
fund their innovation projects. In this context, the CIR
has addressed a clear market failure, allowing them to
expand their investment and foster their collaborations.
Based on this evidence, S3 strategies might offer relevant
opportunities to ﬁrms in traditional sectors. This calls for
more attention in less developed regions for balanced S3
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strategies. Low-tech sectors might be a less ﬂashy but more
rewarding target for public resources. Innovative ﬁrms – as
measured by their patent stock – (irrespective of their sector
of activity) might beneﬁt from policies inspired by S3 prin-
ciples but displacement effects of private investments are to
be expected and additional impacts are likely to remain lim-
ited to the exploitation and commercialization of pre-exist-
ing ideas. Impacts on multinational internationalized ﬁrms
are absent. The complexity of the scheme with its colla-
borative requirements – by increasing transaction and
coordination costs – reduces the returns for complex and
internally diversiﬁed organizations. In light of this evi-
dence, the mobilization of larger ﬁrms remains a challenge
for current and future S3 strategies that should be carefully
considered.
These ﬁndings provide some initial evidence-based
insights to inform and reinforce the debate on the S3
approach and its future post-2020 within the informative
boundaries (and limitations) imposed by the speciﬁc meth-
odology and, more generally, by the programme evaluation
approach. For instance, external validity is a fundamental
challenge and our results based on the experience of the
less developed regions of Italy during the years of the
Great Recession may not be immediately applicable to
other EU regions under less extreme circumstances. There-
fore, the results of this paper call for the investigation of
further case studies in different EU countries by means of
robust counterfactual evaluation methods. The impacts of
current S3 programmes will not unfold early enough for
their evaluation to inform evidence-based debates. The rig-
orous analysis of forerunner programmes might be the only
feasible approach to the development of evidence to inform
key decisions on the future of EU policies after 2020.
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NOTES
1. This process involves the search activities of entrepre-
neurs that identify the potential advantages of general-
purpose technologies in their own economic domain, as
‘entrepreneurs… are in the best position to discover the
domains of R&D and innovation in which a region is likely
to excel given its existing capabilities and productive assets’
(Foray et al., 2011, p. 7).
2. Cohesion Data Platform (see https://cohesiondata.ec.
europa.eu/).
3. The What Works Centre for Local Economic Growth
is a collaboration between the LSE, Centre for Cities and
Arup.
4. For detailed information, see the PON R&C website
(http://www.ponrec.it/).
5. The co-ﬁnancing share plus additional national
resources earmarked to research activities from the
Research Facilitation Fund (FAR).
6. See S3platform.jrc.ec.europa.eu/.
7. After the preliminary checks of formal validity of the
proposals pursued by a dedicated ministerial ofﬁce, nine
thematic panels of technical–scientiﬁc experts (one panel
for each area of activity) evaluated the projects, attributing
them a score. Subsequently, an additional ﬁnal evaluation
was pursued by another independent committee that took
into account the views of the experts and attributed to
the projects an additional score according to the results of
detailed checks on the physical establishment where the
proposed activities would have been carried out.
8. OpenCoesione (https://opencoesione.gov.it/it/) is the
Italian governmental portal that collects data on all ﬁnan-
cial subsidies co-ﬁnanced by EU funds and those ﬁnanced
by national resources in Italy. This covers the overwhelm-
ing majority of the subsidies available for ﬁrms located in
less developed regions.
9. The control leads to a 40% reduction of the initial
sample: 1172 of 2078 observations remain in the sample
after matching the CIR database with the CERVED data-
base on ﬁrm-level characteristics. The composition of the
sample in terms of treated (11%) and non-treated ﬁrms
remains balanced.
10. The inclusion of ﬁrms’ ﬁxed effects does not change
the results of the RDD estimations. For the results, see
Appendix C in the supplemental data online.
11. This is the standard speciﬁcation in the literature
(e.g., Bronzini & Iachini, 2014). However, to test robust-
ness, we check for alternative speciﬁcations of the outcomes
variables. In particular, we speciﬁed them as relative vari-
ation and used the variation only between 2010 and
2014, with qualitatively similar results.
12. The results are available from the authors upon request.
13. See www.ec.europa.eu/eurostat/.
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